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Abstract: The implementation of the common and universally applicable United Nations’ 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) requires differentiated governance frameworks at 
all levels, as it falls short to use one governance style only—hierarchical, network or market 
governance—or any one style combination that is believed to be fit-for-all-purposes. The 
article introduces the guiding principle of “Common But Differentiated Governance” 
(CBDG) and illustrates how this principle can make the SDGs work. It will be shown that, 
after more than 15 years’ experience with the concept of “metagovernance” (how to combine 
different governance styles into successful governance frameworks), there seems to be some 
convergence towards using this as comprehensive approach to achieve situationally 
appropriate governance frameworks. In this article, we have elaborated how policy makers 
could use metagovernance, combined with key governance principles, as mechanism to 
support analysis, design and management of SDG governance frameworks, to make failures 
noticed, and to suggest mitigation measures. Metagovernance respects common principles 
like rule of law, but takes as starting point that there may be different pathways to achieve 
them. A possible step-by-step approach for SDG implementation with metagovernance is 
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proposed, as well as establishing governance support arrangements to assist process design, 
review, monitoring and evaluation, at least at the national level.  
Keywords: sustainable development goals; SDGs; common but differentiated governance; 
CBDG; metagovernance; sustainability governance; hierarchical governance; network 
governance; market governance; implementation; review 
 
1. Introduction: SDGs between Universality and Diversity 
After more than 20 years of work and research on sustainable development (SD) policies, strategies 
and procedural approaches in general, the importance of governance for SD is uncontested. While not 
entirely new in light of the global challenge of moving towards SD, the Post 2015 Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) will pose particular challenges on the governance aspects of their 
implementation. For the first time in history, Heads of States will adopt [1] at the United Nations (UN) 
level universally applicable goals and targets for all aspects of SD, in contrast to the sectoral goals 
and targets under global conventions such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), as a set of goals succeeding the 
Millennium Development Goals that expire in 2015. While the SDGs as proposed by the UN Open 
Working Group [2] are qualitative expressions and also the sub-goals (or “targets” [3]) are 
predominantly qualitative, the latter all have a desired direction, which mostly comes with a target year 
or timeline (mostly 2030). Some sub-goals/targets are quantified. As the political and academic debates 
have shown, and even more revealing when it comes to indicators for measuring progress, the more 
things become concrete, the more the challenge arises between, on the one hand, universally applicable 
goals and (quantified) targets, and, on the other hand, the need for diversification at the levels of 
implementation. This challenge materializes predominantly at national level, but also subnational [4]. 
That different levels of administration should develop their own, specific approach to translate globally 
agreed policies and targets was already identified in 1992 and enshrined as Principle 7—“Common but 
Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR)”—in the Rio Declaration [5]. However, this Principle has become 
somewhat a stalling argument, caught in the focus on financing—as can also be observed in the UN 
negotiations on Means of Implementation—and in general in a North–South dichotomy, while the world 
is facing an “explosion of complexity” [6] (p. 1). Indeed, the world is different than in 1992—be it only 
because of the evolvement of “emerging economies” and “newly industrialized countries” and their 
rising middle-classes. Moreover, the world is interconnected through information and communication 
technology, and social media have emerged as powerful means to induce change. 
An overall proxy for CBDR has been suggested by Kitzes et al. [7] in the context of sustainable 
consumption and production (SCP) as “shrink and share”, which is a translation of the concept of 
contraction (of their footprint) and convergence (into the sustainable quadrant of the HDI/Footprint 
matrix) [8]. It points to the responsibility of developed countries beyond providing financial means, 
namely working in their own realm on their ecological footprint. On the flip side the issue of population 
growth cannot be neglected [9], neither can the fact that some middle-income countries have a higher total 
footprint or greenhouse gas emission levels than Western countries, though not (yet) per capita [10]. The 
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aim of contraction and convergence would be to achieve a higher Human Development Index (HDI), for 
example, with only modestly increasing the footprint [11]. Differentiated development trajectories 
would mean that all countries aim to reach “sustainable human development”, as UNDP depicted it in 
its Human Development Report 2013 [12] (p. 35). Paragraph 247 of the Rio+20 Outcome document [13] 
touches upon the concept of CBDR, but it does not follow the North–South divide and with that enables 
a finer differentiation between countries, namely according to their capacities [14] (p. 5).  
What about governance—the way the global goals will be translated at national and other levels? In 
this article, this question is addressed as follows. Section 2 defines SDG governance and suggests a 
guiding principle. Section 3 discusses characteristics of sustainable development governance and reflects 
which role the concept of metagovernance might play for designing and managing SDG governance 
frameworks. It is illustrated for a number of SDG sub-goals what applying the guiding principle in 
combination with metagovernance thinking could bring about (Section 5). In Section 6, a step-by-step 
approach to implementing the SDGs will be suggested. Section 7 provides a summary and outlook. 
Figure 1 summarizes the article in one graphic overview, which may be used as a reference “mind 
map” during the setting up and management of governance frameworks for the implementation of  
the SDGs. 
 
Figure 1. Common but Differentiated Governance for the Sustainable Development Goals: 
A “mind map” (own composition).  
2. The Principle of “Common But Differentiated Governance” (CBDG) 
Based on the set of SDGs and targets to be adopted in September 2015 at the UN Summit on the  
post-2015 development agenda in New York, nation states will not only need to define specified targets 
and (sub-)timelines reflecting their situation, but they also need to design corresponding processes for 
implementation. There is a need for “mindful approaches and means to get from A to B, whether it is 
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called a plan, strategy, roadmap, action plan or transition pathway” [15] (p. 143). “Mindful” is used here 
in the connotation of combining ongoing scrutiny of existing expectations, bringing in new experiences, 
the willingness and capability to make sense of unprecedented events, dealing with context and improve 
foresight [16] (pp. 41ff).  
Implementation of the SDGs requires systemic thinking: comprehensive approaches (taking into 
account all relevant aspects) and, in addition, a holistic view. The latter implies trying to keep in mind 
the importance of the whole and the interdependence of its parts, both horizontally and vertically 
(downstream as well as upstream). Horizontal coordination is essential because progress in one goal area 
could generate positive spillover effects in others, which may not be recognized in the absence of such 
coordination [17].  
As already identified in Agenda 21 [18] and further elaborated, researched and underpinned ever 
since, developing and implementing of SD policies (i.e., including goals and targets) takes place in a 
multi-sector, multi-level and multi-actor setting. Other key elements to take into account are [19]  
(p. 536), [15] (pp. 143–145), [20] (pp. 17–19): 
• The knowledge dimension, including the quality of the science-policy interface;  
• Reflexivity (social systems change as result of interactions with their environment, be it 
consciously or not); and  
• The time dimension, including intergenerational justice, and in particular bringing in the long-term 
perspective in predominantly short-term mechanisms of politics and economy.  
All these are dimensions of governance that will need to be considered and tackled in future “mindful 
approaches” for implementing the SDGs.  
In this article we define the term governance broadly, in order to cover all governance styles and 
definitions of specific governance approaches and excluding none of them. A broad definition that 
emphasizes the relational dimension of governance is “Governance is the totality of interactions, in 
which government, other public bodies, private sector and civil society participate, aiming at solving 
societal problems or creating societal opportunities” [21] (p. 11). Another broad definition adds the 
normative dimension: Governance is “a collection of normative insights into the organization of 
influence, steering, power, checks and balances in human societies” [22] (p. 9).  
Governance styles can be defined as “the processes of decision-making and implementation, including 
the manner in which the organizations involved relate to each other” [23]. Three ideal-typical (in Weberian 
sense) [24] governance styles are usually distinguished: hierarchical, network and market governance—
and variations [21,25–28]. They seem to reflect the three main “ways of life” distinguished in cultural 
theory: “hierarchism”, “egalitarism” and “autonomism” [21] (pp. 57–61), [29].  
A governance framework can be defined as “the totality of instruments, procedures, processes and 
role division among actors designed to tackle a group of societal problems” [30] (p. 886).  
Every country has a different “starting point” and preference for a governance style (combination), 
due to constitutional settings, traditions, culture, political practice, geography and resulting 
environmental, social and economic circumstances. Empirical research on governance for SD suggests, 
however, that countries (or entities at other levels) get only as far as it gets with the one same approach 
or governance style, and along the way they take up other styles of governance (e.g., [31]). This already 
points to an approach to governance that will be discussed in this article: metagovernance or the art to 
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design and manage diversified combinations of governance styles, also denoted as “the governance of 
governance” [32] (p. 106). 
While it is clear that there will be common goals which are universally applicable, including universal 
principles such as rule of law, the above leads to the conclusion that the ways to achieve the SDGs need 
to be differentiated because universal governance recipes alone are not going to work. In order to put 
this insight to the forefront, it seems useful to introduce for the implementation of the SDGs the guiding 
principle of “Common But Differentiated Governance” (CBDG). What might be “common” has been 
itself subject of the OWG and other groups that have elaborated sets of SDGs, alongside with the 
discussion whether there should be a stand-alone goal on governance, or whether it should be integrated 
in the individual thematic goals. As a result of this discussion, the SDGs include both types of goals. 
The agreed governance-related goals and sub-goals hence represent the “common”, which has to be 
translated in a “differentiated” way when implementing the thematic goals. Within the (proposed) two 
stand-alone governance-related SDGs 16 and 17, the following Sub-goals are among the most relevant 
for the institutional, instrumental and procedural aspects of governance (Table 1):  
Table 1. Examples of governance sub-goals in the SDGs (Open Working Group, July 2014 [2]).  
Goal 16, and herein especially “build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels”: 
16.3 promote the rule of law (…) and ensure equal access to justice for all 
16.6 develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels 
16.7 ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels 
16.10 ensure public access to information (…) 
Goal 17, on “Means of Implementation”: 
17.9 capacity building (…) 
17.14 enhance policy coherence for SD 
17.16 enhance global partnerships (…) Complemented by multi-stakeholder partnerships (…) 
17.17 encourage (…) Public, public-private and civil society partnerships (…) 
17.18 enhance capacity building (…) to increase the availability of (…) data 
Among the thematic goals 1–15, the sub-goals referring to governance aspects, or financial or other 
means of implementation (MoI), are indicated by letters a., b. and c. Examples include: Mobilization of 
resources to implement programs (1.a.), expand capacity-building support for various technologies 
(6.a.), strengthen the participation of local communities (6.b.), strengthening development planning 
(11.a.), implementing integrated policies and plans (11.b.), strengthen scientific and technological 
capacities (12.a.), implement tools to monitor SD impacts (12.b.), and raising capacities for planning 
and management (13.b.). 
Together with the other governance/finance/MoI goals, each country needs to find or further develop 
its tailor-made way for implementing the SDGs. A SWOT [33] analysis to take stock of the existing 
governance framework will be a first essential step. This is not something new: “Taking context as the 
starting point” is a widely acknowledge principle for addressing international conflict and fragility [34] 
(p. 32). The next step is setting up a process that is credible for national actors as well as in a  
supra-national context is the next step. These steps should include assessing the political and 
administrative setting with “SD lenses” (the governance of SD), i.e., identifying the dispositions in terms 
of governance styles, the direction along which to move and the missing elements to fill in. Developing 
Sustainability 2015, 7 12300 
 
 
thematic SD targets for a country should build on a stock-taking of existing goals and targets in sectoral 
and overarching plans. Monitoring and reporting should be part of the governance design and enable 
staying on track. In Section 6, a comprehensive step-by-step approach to CBDG for SDGs will be proposed. 
3. What Kind of Governance for CBDG? 
3.1. Governance and Sustainable Development 
Conceptualizations of governance have been somewhat confusing, most notably with firstly the 
evolving notion of “governance instead of government” and other normatively laden concepts all 
promoting networking and/or market-oriented approaches (e.g., New Public Management) over a 
hierarchical state. Over time, a heuristic perspective of governance has become more the mainstream, 
namely that governance should be considered as an important perspective of policy-making. This has also 
been reflected in the development of the SDGs, including the solution to reflect governance as separate  
sub-goals within the Goals framework. Within this overall governance perspective, concrete governance 
choices are obviously normative, as they are based on (political) positions based on societal values.  
For the SDGs, a number of normative attributes and goals have been agreed such as rule of law, 
accountability and participation. These are elements of the “good governance” characteristics as 
promoted and demanded by the World Bank and other financial institutions in development cooperation 
since the 1990s. Alongside with its promotion of markets as best mechanisms for economic 
development—the neoclassical economic paradigm—this approach has been criticized as culturally 
blind and Western biased. Biermann et al. [35] underline that “good governance” must not dominate the 
SDG governance agenda at the expense of other important aspects. With their inclusion in the “common” 
SDGs, some “good governance” elements have now found universal recognition. However, this will also 
need to be translated in national contexts, at least with regard to the timeline. 
In the context of SD, governance has always played a strong role. Meadowcroft [19] (p. 536) even 
argues that “SD is really all about governance”. As flawed governance practices have been considered as 
encouraging unsustainable development patterns, political intervention, i.e., improved governance, would 
be needed to shift societal development towards a more sustainable path. This includes the assumption that 
it is possible for societies to orient socioeconomic development in a desirable (sustainable) direction. 
Furthermore, for such fundamental reform it is necessary that a wide range of societal actors collaborate 
(“multi-actor”), that governments at all levels need to play an active role (“multi-level” [36,37]) and that 
the need for continuously developing knowledge requires participation from society as a whole. Together 
with the complex causal chains and uncertainties that the SD challenge entails, as well as the persistence 
of environmental problems despite “decades of regulations” [19] (p. 537), these requirements have led to 
a general preference for “networking” as governance style, as well leaning towards using market based 
instruments, over the traditional, state-centered and hierarchical style of governance with legislation as 
main tool.  
Explicitly oriented to the change agenda of SD, the approaches of “transition management” [38] or 
“transformation” [39,40] also imply a preference for networking, but some assign an active role to 
government as well [19] (p. 542). Another more recently evolved concept is that of “adaptive  
management” [19] (p. 542) which emphasizes resilience and diversity as important ingredients and 
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principles. The preference for networking as governance style seems to make sense for the challenges of 
sustainability, which are impossible to “control” from a single center [19] (p. 537). However, it is 
questionable to which extend it is applicable in deeply hierarchical or non-democratic states, and how 
networks and markets can produce results without some structure and rules typically provided  
by hierarchies. 
3.2. Strength and Weaknesses of Governance Styles 
Research suggests that each individual governance style has its strengths, but also its weaknesses [21] 
(pp. 51–55), [35]. Networks are high in trust and inclusion, and are open to “win-win” solutions; on the 
other hand, they may have weak democratic legitimation (who decides which stakeholders may become 
members of governance networks, and to whom are the members accountable?) and sometimes result in 
endless talks without reaching conclusions. Market governance on the other hand values efficiency, time, 
and also individual responsibility (empowerment); typical failures include lack of empathy and trust, 
and lack of mechanisms to ensure level playing fields for companies. Compared to hierarchical 
governance, network and market governance often lack structure, reliability, accountability and ensuring 
equal rights both for citizens (justice) and for business (level playing fields). Hierarchical governance is 
strong in terms of control, lines of command, clarity of responsibility, reliability, and elaborated planning 
systems with potentially a long-term dimension built-in. It is needed, for example, for legally binding 
agreements. Typical weaknesses include inflexibility, bureaucratic procedures, a closed/inward looking 
culture, disincentive to synergy between sectors, sometimes lack of innovation and bottom-up initiative, 
lack of ownership, lack of mechanisms to prevent lock-in effects, and low levels of awareness of 
unexpected and unpredictable events. 
It is not surprising that such weaknesses—usually called “governance failures”—occur, because, as 
Jessop argued, “failure is a central feature of all social relations” [41] (p. 43). Governance failures are 
rarely without costs. Nevertheless, these costs may be considered as inevitable by those who consider 
one of the governance styles as panacea, regardless of the context; a strong belief that one style might 
work under all circumstances may make governors blind for the systemic and normative origin of certain 
failures [21] (pp. 57ff). Jessop therefore underlines the importance of self-reflexivity—a principle that 
is meanwhile stressed across the board in (SD) governance discourse—as well as the need to combine 
governance styles. 
3.3. From “Either … Or” to “And … And”  
Another theory development matches with empirical insights in SD governance: according to Ulrich 
Beck’s concept of “second modernity” [42], societal evolution is characterized by tense relationships 
between contradictory phenomena, which coexist and even need each other. Second modernity hence 
means “and … and” instead of “either … or”. In development thinking, where paradigms (patterns of ideas, 
values, methods and behavior which fit together and are mutually reinforcing tend to coexist) overlap, 
coalesce and separate, this was also recognized already more than two decades ago [43]. Typical examples 
from SD governance include that top-down and bottom-up initiatives are not contradictory but mutually 
enforcing, and that both (strong) leadership and (decentralized) ownership are needed [31]. “Globalization” 
and its counter trend “localization” now co-exist in the term “localization”.  
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This thinking has been reflected in the concept of “transgovernance”, which emphasizes that 
transitions towards SD require understanding how our societies function and what are drivers and 
obstacles for societal change [22,44], implying that SD governance should be informed by the whole 
range of social sciences: not only by economics and political science, but also by e.g., sociology, 
anthropology and psychology. A key element of transgovernance is the concept of “knowledge 
democracy” [45], which links three pairs of coexisting contradictions: representative and participatory 
democracy, disciplinary and transdisciplinary science, and top-down and bottom-up media. 
Convergence towards “and … and” can also be observed in other arenas, such as research on risk 
governance. With respect to the tragedy of the commons, for example, Renn [46] (p. 403) points out that 
privatization (market governance) bears the risk of hampering the imperative of fairness, state control 
and bureaucracy (hierarchical governance). Voluntary agreements (network governance) depend on a 
fragile consensus of all participants. As market, state, civil society pluralism and experts individually 
fail, or do not succeed in providing effectiveness, resilience, efficiency and fairness, Renn advocates a 
“cooperative steering model” of the four spheres [46] (pp. 530–533). This resembles a lot the 
metagovernance approach that could be instrumental for CBDG, as further elaborated in Section 4. 
3.4. States, Markets and Power 
In the context of development cooperation, there has been debate about the role of markets and the 
state for economic development, and subsequently on the relationship between governance and 
economic development (i.e., the question whether improved governance leads to economic development 
or the other way round). Both questions have seen some convergence and contextualization: There has 
been convergence towards markets and states as governance framework for economic development [47] 
(pp. 164,172), and support has emerged for a more context-specific relationship between governance 
and development. Therefore, there is a need to bring back the focus in research on “what works” and to 
“acquire deep contextual knowledge” [47] (p. 174). For development economics, Sachs [48] (pp. 74–81) 
draws the lesson that “complexity requires a differential diagnosis” and Pomerantz [47] (p. 172) urges 
that the “perennial distance” of political scientists and economists needs to be overcome in order to 
resolve unsettled questions. This claim connects to the line of thinking of “transgovernance” and meets 
a meanwhile rising criticism of how the discipline of economics has developed (see, e.g., Piketty [49] 
(pp. 573–575)). 
SD governance also needs to address issues of power, a largely neglected topic in SD research so far. 
We need to realize at all times that “discussions about governance issues are often sensitive and always 
passionate, as they relate to who holds power and information” [50]. Economic power may be a lot 
stronger than political power, among others because multi-national companies are nowadays 
geographically “footloose”. Power is needed to enforce SD solutions, but is also used to block 
transitions. Power relations play different roles in different governance styles. As network governance 
will without doubt be an essential part of SDG implementation, SDG governors should be aware that 
this governance style tends to deal better with “soft” power than with “hard/economic power”: a reality 
check on this is necessary. 
Both the capacity and the willingness of states to exercise power to steer societal developments vary 
widely. There are governments willing, in principle, to implement the SDGs but lacking the institutional 
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and administrative resources and quality to execute this. They might need to (re)build the required 
institutions and governance system. Hierarchically dominated governments may lack the willingness to 
share power with societal actors, who might be—sometimes better—capable to induce societal change 
and bring sustainable development about. The analysis by Acemoglu and Robinson in their “Why 
Nations Fail”, that “inclusive institutions” are a condition for innovation [51], would deserve some 
consideration. Metagovernance thinking supports (re)building of institutions and the governance system, 
by considering options in a broad and reflexive way (see Section 6).  
Now, against the background of these more theoretical background notes, what could be a practical 
governance approach to implement CBDG? 
4. CBDG in Practice: A Metagovernance Approach to Design Governance Frameworks 
Governance for the SDGs poses the challenge how to combine different governance approaches 
successfully “on the ground” into tailor-made, i.e., “differentiated” mixtures that are reflexive and 
dynamic and at the same contribute to common, universal goals. The challenge is also how to connect 
the “global” and the “local” levels [52]. The “State of the Environment 2015” report of the European 
Environment Agency defines the transition to diversified governance as one of 11 global megatrends 
that are relevant for environmental sustainability [53]. Overall, there seems to be convergence around 
the insight that not one recipe for a specific governance style will bring success, and that sustainable 
development is a case in point.  
4.1. Metagovernance: Definition and Discussion  
Section 3 introduced that metagovernance might be a useful concept to deliver differentiated 
governance for the SDGs. Its basic idea is that it is possible to develop situationally appropriate 
combinations of contrasting and even mutually undermining styles of governance. A broad definition is: 
“Metagovernance is a means by which to produce some degree of coordinated governance, by designing 
and managing sound combinations of hierarchical, market and network governance, to achieve the best 
possible outcomes from the viewpoint of those responsible for the performance of public-sector 
organizations: public managers as ‘metagovernors’” [21] (p. 68). The need for such a concept was, 
among others, formulated by Davis and Rhodes [54] (p. 25) when they argued that “the trick will not be 
to manage contracts or steer networks but to mix the three systems effectively when they conflict with 
and undermine one another”. As mentioned in Section 2, academic literature of the last two decades 
often mentions three “ideal-typical” governance styles (hierarchy, network, and market) as providing the 
building blocks of governance frameworks. Indeed, it has been argued that all distinguished governance 
approaches are combinations of the ideal-types [21]. Hierarchical governance is often considered  
“old-style” governance, whereas network and market governance have been referred to as “new modes 
of governance” [55].  
The three governance styles differ across more than 35 dimensions (see, e.g., [21], pp. 45–50 and  
329–350 for a review of such differences based on extensive literature review). This means that for each 
of these dimensions, there are in principle three “modes” (or mode combinations) of action. Examples 
include the roles of government in society (hierarchy: ruler, network: partner, or market: service 
provider); affinity with problem types (crisis, complex problem, or routine issue); mode of control 
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(authority, trust, or price); strategy type (planning, learning or entrepreneurial); type of relations 
(dependent, interdependent, or independent); communication modes (informing, having dialogues, or 
marketing); communicative interaction (telling, arguing, or bargaining); and preferred instruments 
(legislation, covenant, or contract). At least one of these dimensions is an ethical one: the three styles 
differ with regard to “relational values”, i.e., how other people’s values are valued [22]. Hegemony and 
separatism are values that can be associated with hierarchical governance, pluralism and tolerance with 
network governance and indifference with market governance [44]. 
Preferences for one of the governance styles (across most of the dimensions) are not uncommon 
among politicians and policy makers, but also not among academics. This may go back to their academic 
discipline (e.g., law, economics, business administration, or political science), and may be culturally 
influenced. Many political scientists in consensus-style democracies like The Netherlands and Denmark, 
for instance, are advocates of network governance. Arguments in favor of one style are often supported 
with empirical evidence based on case studies of policy issues for which this governance style indeed 
may be plausible. For example, cases of crisis governance will usually show that networking is essential 
but the core is well-designed command and control patterns, whereas in local neighborhood projects 
with wicked and complex challenges network governance is most likely dominating the mix.  
Scholars have argued that metagovernance may imply a return to state-centered governance. Bell and 
Hindmoor [56] argue that states have not lost their hierarchical power but adopted also a broader range 
of government strategies to deal with non-state actors, while remaining in the driving seat. This  
“state-centric relational approach” enables them to work together with networks and markets while 
securing governmental influence. The ability of governments to choose a governance style (mixture) 
has, however, its limitations, for example because of the need to keep sufficient public support [57]. 
Whitehead [58] (p. 13) observed that while metagovernance arrangements may increase steering and 
accountability of governments, they may at the same time be “choking and constraining the flexibilities” 
of decentralized networks.  
Other scholars maintain the opposite: metagovernance may weaken hierarchy. According to 
Davies [59] (p. 4), several influential strands of metagovernance thinking all pay insufficient attention 
to hierarchy, and especially about what he holds as a central feature of hierarchy, namely coercion. 
It is essential to note that metagovernance is not a governance style in itself: it is about combining 
governance styles into frameworks that deliver. There are basically two approaches to metagovernance: 
a broader one which seems necessary for SDG implementation at (sub)national level, considering the 
huge variety of challenges, circumstances, cultures and traditions among countries, and a narrower one. 
The first is metagovernance of all governance styles (e.g., [21,30]). It has a wider analytical lens and a 
richer set of “tools” than the second approach, metagovernance of one single style—usually network 
governance—as advocated by, e.g., Sørensen and Torfing [60] for specific situations where networks 
are prevailing. These two approaches have been named second and first order metagovernance,  
respectively [61].  
Metagovernance has gained quite some popularity: Between 2004 and 2015, the number of publications 
per year in which metagovernance was mentioned increased with a factor 6.5; related concepts such as 
adaptive governance which are close to the metagovernance concept showed an even stronger raise in 
popularity (factor 50) [62]. However, the approach is in practice probably more widely applied than these 
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numbers illustrate. A comparison of five case studies on successful public-sector policy projects showed 
that the responsible managers used it although they had never heard of the term [21].  
4.2. Key Characteristics 
Metagovernance is about combining bottom-up and top-down in productive ways; it suggests that 
seemingly contradictory approaches may be reconciled; it accepts Beck’s “second modernity” (see 
Section 3). It aims to make network governance, market governance and hierarchical governance work 
together in a particular way for a particular situation and allows for different governance at different levels. 
By mapping the needs and by supporting solutions towards context-specific sustainability, this may 
contribute to reducing the vagueness of the SD concept and the complexity of its implementation [63]. It 
helps managing plurality with the aim to induce more coherence [64]. It is sensitive to different 
administrative cultures, and to values, traditions and norms in a country, which could stimulate the 
emergence of successful governance [38]. It suggests to abstain from selecting one main governance 
style a priori, but to develop instead tailor-made combinations of styles that are determined after having 
analyzed the “governance environment”. In states or administrations like the European Commission with 
a general preference for hierarchical measures (supported by a large percentage of lawyers among their 
staff), this stimulates to look beyond legislation as the only answer to societal challenges. The European 
Commission’s First Vice-President Frans Timmermans formulated the need for a different approach  
as follows: 
“I challenge that, if there is a problem, we create a law to solve that problem. I am not sure that the 
modern and sustainable economy is best served with the premise that for every problem there should be 
a legal solution. That’s the only thing I challenge. I don’t challenge the goals” [65]. The Commission’s 
recent proposal on “Better Regulation” [66] states that “Better regulation is not about ‘more’ or ‘less’ EU 
legislation; nor is it about deregulating or deprioritizing certain policy areas or compromising the values 
that we hold dear: social and environmental protection, and fundamental rights including health—to name 
just a few examples. Better regulation is about making sure we actually deliver on the ambitious policy 
goals we have set ourselves”. The “Better Regulation” package (of over 500 pages) includes an extensive 
“Better Regulation Toolbox” covering four categories of policy instruments: “Hard”, legally binding 
rules; “soft” regulation; education and information; economic instruments. It remains to be seen how 
well it will succeed to mix in other than legal tools, while keeping regulations that are important for SD 
and that work.  
For countries with a hierarchical tradition, metagovernance triggers opening up to network and market 
types of governance instruments, while acknowledging that this would redefine existing power relations. 
For consensus democracies, it suggests that rules and structure might make consent better 
implementable, and for market-oriented nations that states need to establish guard rails and that 
cooperation might help when competition does not do the trick. For a country-specific SDG 
implementation governments might consider establishing support bodies/networks that help designing, 
reviewing and evaluating specific governance approaches as well as improving policy coherence: 
different SDG targets should not undermine each other or counteract within a goal area and between 
goals. This requires integration so that environment, social and economic aspects come together in each 
area rather than being treated as separate pillars. A nexus approach might be useful. Examples of such 
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bodies are Sustainable Development Councils mirroring the multi-sector, -level and -actor situation. 
They have been successful supporters and watchdogs of such processes in a number of countries. 
4.3. How Does A “Metagovernor” Know What Is the “Right” Thing to Do? 
It may be argued that metagovernance is a technocratic, hyper-rational approach to governance. How 
can a metagovernor know what is the best solution to a challenge, and doesn’t metagovernance make 
things unnecessarily complex? An answer to the first question is that he or she does not know what is 
“right”, because the idea that there are right and wrong answers “out there” is in contrast with the concept 
itself. The challenge is not about the choice between hierarchical, network and market governance in 
order to determine the right style, but about choosing the situationally best role for the government, 
taking into account the characteristics of all three governance styles [67] (p. 52).  
A metagovernor (i.e., someone who takes up some leadership role in governance analysis, design 
and/or management; [21,68]), therefore tries to take a wider perspective on problem setting, possible 
solutions, and the choice of institutions, instruments, processes and actor roles than a governance leader 
who works from a fixed set of assumptions on these topics. This does not mean that metagovernors can 
be completely “neutral”: we all have our values and believe that they are “right”. Although it therefore 
seems a difficult job, for some managers this seems to come natural (see the five case studies in [21]). 
Whatever they call their approach (metagovernance, common sense) they are all sensitive for situational 
aspects and are able to put their own preference for a governance style into perspective. They need to be 
able to think beyond the governance style that is preferential in their national culture and traditions, and 
beyond a dominant governance style fashion. They will meet resistance—and that is one of the reasons 
why they may fail: metagovernance failure exists and therefore Jessop [32] suggests that metagovernors 
would benefit from having a dose of “self-reflexive irony” (see also Section 6).  
As regards the second question—does not metagovernance add another layer of complexity to 
governance—the counter argument could be that not applying a metagovernance approach makes things 
complex. A policy-maker who analyses and designs all governance issues from a network perspective 
might consider observed hierarchical processes and structures as disturbing “externalities”. Taking the 
wider metagovernance view implies acknowledging of hierarchy as one of the governance styles, with 
its own pros and cons, as useful for one’s “governance toolbox”.  
4.4. Multi-Level Metagovernance 
Implementing the SDGs is a multi-level governance challenge, and the challenges and circumstances are 
different at all levels. If governance frameworks at one level are not well linked to those on other levels, the 
result may be total failure. Therefore, it is essential to create multi-level governance frameworks. The 
European Union has been characterized as such a major supranational instance of multi-level 
metagovernance governing a wide range of complex and interrelated problems [69]. However, its practice 
is not flawless, for example regarding the rather inflexible governance frameworks for its Cohesion 
Policy funding programs. Fixed frameworks ignore the different realities at different levels of 
administration. It may well be that at local level network governance works best, while at subnational 
level setting legal frameworks constitute the main rationale. From other areas there are also examples 
for the other way around: e.g., city mayors introducing a change in a top-down way—like in the City of 
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London on congestion tax, or in the Brazilian city of Curitiba on public transport, and then such 
initiatives are supported by incentives (like subsidies) from a higher level. Therefore, the 
metagovernance rule “there is not a one-size-fits-all solution” also applies to multi-level governance. A 
recent study in Estonia on empowerment of the local level by the EU’s multi-level Cohesion Policy 
framework (EU, national, local) also shows that metagovernance is needed at all levels to bring about 
the desired results. While the policy framework foresees multi-level collaborative governance with 
co-managing of funds, it turned out that contrary to what was expected, Cohesion Policy had not led to 
any significant redistribution of policy control. Long-standing power dependencies in the domestic 
governance system with a hierarchical tradition have remained characteristic [70]. 
While this article focuses on the governance for implementing the SDGs at sub-global levels, its 
recommendations are also valid for the overall architecture of a multi-level and—tiered review process, 
including peer reviews, as currently being discussed (see e.g., comprehensive proposal by Beisheim [71]) 
and to be decided in September 2015. This also includes considerations for the future role of the UN High 
Level Political Forum for Sustainable Development (HLPF) [72].  
4.5. Metagovernance and Systemic Change 
It is contested in how far the SDGs will trigger deep systemic changes, with some considering the 
Pope’s 2015 encyclical as a stronger call [73]. Clearly weak seems the unquestioned (and not 
differentiated) SDG for economic growth. Systemic changes would entail, for example, measuring 
economic and societal progress beyond GDP and the transition from fossil to renewable energy. 
Preliminary analysis of the Dutch Environmental Assessment Agency PBL concludes that some goals 
can indeed only be achieved in the Netherlands with fundamental changes in policy and approach [74]. 
Other goals and targets will be achievable with incremental change within existing systemic conditions 
and paradigms. In general, the “easier” roads towards sustainability are about optimizing existing 
pathways, and innovative solutions within such frameworks are important, because not all existing 
(sub)systems are unsustainable.  
In terms of governance styles, systemic transitions often require hierarchical interventions. Recent 
examples are the German energy transition (“Energiewende”) initiated by the German Chancellor in 
2011 and the Clean Power Plan as proposed by the President of the USA in August 2015. The 
“Energiewende” process has featured some metagovernance elements: It started with a government 
initiative establishing a dedicated Commission, which organized stakeholder and citizens’ consultations. 
The Commission’s conclusions were adopted by the German government with legal provisions and an 
action program, and the subsequent phases saw ample investment in creating public support. 
The Netherlands pioneered in making systemic change the core of their environmental governance in 
the 4th National Environmental Policy Plan (NEP) of 2001 [19] (p. 524), with some successes in tackled 
subsystems (e.g., greenhouse horticulture changed from high energy consumption to energy neutrality 
or net energy production; water management changed its paradigm from fighting against water (building 
higher dikes) towards working with water, which has resulted in a complete reorientation of investments 
in the water sector). Government incentives resulted in a new research focus and innovation in practice. 
Typical for the Netherlands’ history of network governance, these transitions were not driven by 
legislation. The weak use of hierarchical governance is likely one of the reasons why the energy 
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transition towards renewables, which was also part of the 4th NEP in 2001, has still not materialized. 
Together with the struggles of the German “Energiewende” after passing dedicated pieces of legislation, 
it points to the challenges in energy politics, characterized by powerful vested interests (see also the 
short discussion on the energy SDG in Section 5).  
In any case, systemic changes require out-of-the-box thinking for which a metagovernance approach 
could be useful. This also applies to the easier roads of optimizing pathways within existing systems.  
4.6. Metagovernance in the Private Sector 
Metagovernance shares a multi-actor view with the “beyond cockpit” approach proposed by  
Hajer et al. [40]: governments and intergovernmental organizations, and businesses, cities and civil 
society need to play their role. This role may be cooperation, but also self-governance, co-decision, or, 
at the other end of the spectrum, being a sounding board for top-down policy, depending on the situation. 
One main difference is that Hajer et al. combine desired governance characteristics with policy 
principles, in particular planetary boundaries, safe and just operating space, the energetic society and 
green competition, which they consider as prerequisites. 
Metagovernance is not a government-only approach and hence business actors or civil society 
organizations might also take this multi-perspective approach; in every organization there may be 
“metagovernors” [44]. Derkx and Glasbergen [64] have shown how ambitious companies used a 
metagovernance approach in setting voluntary product standards, in an attempt to improve the existing 
networking. Interestingly, the outcome of the cases studied was not the lowest common denominator, 
but very strict reference standards. The approach had a strong trust-building dimension with positive 
effects on future collaborations. For those involved in public (meta)governance to implement the SDGs 
it would be recommendable to establish linkages with such front-running companies and to further 
stimulate this type of capacity building among all stakeholders. This might, for example, facilitate 
public–private partnership building. 
4.7. Costs of Governance Failures and Benefits of Metagovernance 
Institutions “entrusted with creating a sustainable future cannot afford to have a weak governance 
structure” [72] (p.14). “Cannot afford” on the one hand has a normative, ethical dimension (we cannot 
afford failure because of our responsibility for next generations). On the other hand, there is a relevant 
financial dimension. It seems plausible that applying metagovernance requires somewhat more human 
resources than applying a standard or simplified governance framework, but the return on investment in 
terms of cost-savings may be huge. A metagovernance-inspired framework does not reject any measures 
up-front, for example. Therefore, measures can be selected that are close enough to existing values and 
traditions and different enough to bring about change, which seems a good predictor of broad acceptance 
of measures as well as prevention of costs caused by resistance and legal procedures. Such a framework 
implies built-in reflections also about long-term impacts. The long-term benefits of preventing lock-ins 
in unsustainable technological investments may be enormous. The reflexive governance attitude also 
promotes awareness of the costs of non-action in case scientific evidence is abundant [75]. To conclude: 
differentiated and “mindful” governance frameworks can let the SDGs offer good value for money. 
Moreover, one could imagine that when developing countries deliver substantially on the SDGs, this 
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could have a positive impact on the political debates on development aid in donor countries. A classical 
problem that could be addressed at the political level is the distributional effect: the costs of appropriate 
governance are usually on the government side (“taxpayers’ money”), while the costs of governance 
failure are economic, social and/or environmental. 
4.8. Applicability and Strategies 
There are different fields of application of metagovernance: analyzing an existing situation, and 
designing and managing new governance frameworks. The use of an analytical metagovernance lens 
resulted in the UNDP/UNEP Poverty and Environment Initiative Program in Tajikistan in better 
understanding particular governance failures, and generated suggestions for policy change, for 
example [76]. It also made clear why cases of policy preparation for soil protection in England, The 
Netherlands and Germany used quite different governance tools [21]. The same case study research 
concluded that public managers of successful policy programs used three metagovernance strategies 
during design and management of policies: 
• Combining different governance approaches into arrangements of institutions, instruments, 
processes and actor constellations which are compatible enough with existing values and traditions 
to be accepted and at the same time different enough to push/pull/nudge towards change;  
• Switching from one to another dominant governance style, for example when a complex and 
contested topic for which a network approach was designed turns into a disaster and suddenly 
command and control (hierarchy) is needed; and  
• Maintenance of a chosen approach by, for example, protecting it against perverse/undermining 
influences in the governance environment. Maintenance complements the combining and 
switching strategies.  
5. Building Governance Frameworks for Selected SDGs 
The following examples illustrate how elements from different governance “families” might be 
mindfully mingled into tailored approaches for some of the governance-related SDG targets (proposed 
version of July 2014) [2]. We only present possibilities, no prescriptions. The essence of metagovernance 
is the perspective that there is no one-size-fits-all to governance, and therefore a detailed prescription is 
impossible: the proof of the pudding is in the eating. The first five targets relate to the “stand-alone” 
governance Goals 16 and 17; subsequently we take energy as example of a thematic SDG. 
5.1. Accountability (Goal 16.6)  
Lack of accountability hampers any serious efforts in international environmental governance [77] 
and this also applies to the broader SD governance agenda. The point is that each governance style has 
weaknesses on accountability, but they are different. In a low-trust hierarchical context, transparency 
may be considered as a threat, as it may lead to exposure of failures. In a network context it may be 
impossible to single out who is to be held accountable for failures: how to hold actors into account for 
outcomes that are a result of collaboration of various actors collaborating in opaque processes [78]? In 
a market approach, accountability mechanisms may risk focusing too much on price over quality. A 
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metagovernance approach would consider such weaknesses and suggest building institutions that are 
able to tackle all of these. Dedicated bodies/networks could help preventing or mitigating governance 
failures. While governments are likely to take the leading role, also other actors might do. Where feasible 
in the national context, it is recommended to include civil society, business as well as research bodies as 
partners. In a number of countries, national/sub-national Sustainable Development Councils or 
Commissions have taken up a monitoring role, which enables them to hold governments to account for 
progress. Accountability is the flipside of responsibility. Where responsibility is going to be shared 
between state and non-state actors, accountability rules and procedures may need to be adjusted to cover 
the whole picture. 
5.2. Rule of Law and Access to Justice (Goal 16.3) 
Rule of law and access to justice are principles that require a certain quality of hierarchical 
governance. Its instruments include regulation, standards, and sanctions to ensure that individuals, 
companies and also administrations can be held accountable, e.g., for damaging common goods. A 
powerful example is the recent ruling of a Dutch court, ordering the state to reduce CO2 emissions by 
25% within five years to protect its citizens from climate change in the world’s first climate liability  
suit [79]. A metagovernance view on SD-relevant law enforcement could lead to choices about who is 
involved (i.e., elements of network governance: see for example the trend to involve citizens and NGOs 
in data collection on environmental crimes). In addition, market governance thinking would make 
sanctions more costly than the profits of trespassing. There is also experience that voluntary agreements 
(network governance) work better when a regulatory “stick” is standing in the corner. Ways to achieve 
justice outside of courts are alternative conflict resolution mechanisms like mediation and mutual gains 
approach. They are typically cheaper and faster than court cases, and often come up with better solutions 
and/or identify “win-win” (“mutual gains” [80]). Conflict resolution could, for example, result in broadening 
the negotiation agendas (portfolio approaches rather than single instrument approaches, see [81]. 
5.3. Partnerships (Goal 17.16, 17.17) 
Partnerships are a soft form of institutions in terms of their structural and juridical dimension, but can 
be very powerful. They are therefore a valuable component in the SDG set, and are seen central in the 
vision of the European Commission [82]. Building partnerships is a mechanism typical for network 
governance. It helps crossing all sorts of boundaries (administrative, legislative, geographical, and 
cultural) when solving SD problems requires this, while at the same time it may leave existing (formal) 
institutions in place. It is a good example of the “and-and” approach. On substance, partnerships are 
hotbeds of innovative solutions, as they are based on trust among parties with contrasting interests and 
ideas. In the EU, the Covenant of Mayors on climate change has become an influential partnership. The 
practice of twinning between administrative entities for capacity building and training is a successful 
example for partnerships between existing EU members and accession countries.  
Similarly, countries could team up across the globe and set up peer processes on SDG 
implementation, to learn from each other and eventually organize peer reviews of progress. This might 
take the form of expert type of peer reviews, as practiced between OECD (Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development) countries, or more stakeholder-based peer reviews, as some countries 
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with a functioning SD strategy have performed, like The Netherlands [83] and Germany [84]. In both 
cases a (independent) national SD Council coordinated the peer review process. Depending on the 
organizational set-up this could include “external” (i.e., non-governmental) peers.  
To overcome potential weaknesses of partnerships such as unclear democratic legitimation, opaqueness 
and inefficiency, a metagovernance approach would add, for example, from hierarchical governance rules 
on accountability, in- or exclusion of participants and transparency, and from market governance measures 
to promote cost-effectiveness and efficiency. There are also various lighter versions of partnerships in 
terms of (formal) commitment, like alliances, coalitions and (internet) communities. 
5.4. Participation (Goal 16.7) 
Participation is a central theme in many SDG governance proposals, but not all participation is 
supportive to achieving (SDG) goals. A metagovernance approach helps reducing typical participation 
“potholes” such as dominance of one group over others, never-ending discussions, lack of accountability 
and lack of ownership. Solutions could include being highly transparent about roles, rights and 
responsibilities of participants and managing of expectations (e.g., does the respective participation 
entail information, collaboration or co-decision?), having procedures in place to balance vocal minorities 
and silent majorities, setting rules for inclusion and exclusion of actors, as well as organizing how to 
codify agreement (e.g., the “Green Deals” in The Netherlands: a series of covenants between government 
and market parties [85] (p. 5)). In a rather strongly hierarchically steered country, experimenting with 
co-decision might not be a realistic starting point but it might work to gradually step up on the 
“participation ladder” while building capacity and trust, as experience of the UNEP-UNDP Poverty and 
Environment Programme has shown in a number of developing countries. Participation can be 
strengthened by adding elements of competition (i.e., market governance) in the governance mix, for 
example by introducing awards. In the European Union, the annual Green Capital Award has proven to 
be a huge incentive for not only the winners but also the other finalists, and their commitment is being 
kept high with the establishment of an EU network of finalists and winners. 
5.5. Capacity Building (Goal 17.18) 
Capacity building is about creating the framework conditions for what needs to be done. In the 
proposed SDGs several Sub-goals refer to capacity building, be it in governmental organizations at all 
levels, in civil society or the business sector. There is, for example, no participation without the capacity 
of the participants to engage in providing solutions and of governments to engage with other actors. The 
CBDG principle and the metagovernance lens could result in better tailored training, skills development 
and capability of all relevant actors to support the implementation of the SDGs.  
Where capacity building is directed at increasing empowerment and ownership “on the ground”, at 
local level, a metagovernance lens points at possible resistance at central level. Hierarchical policy 
makers might need to be convinced, and training programs might be useful to this end, that losing some 
direct steering power does not necessarily imply losing leadership: “to give up dominance at the personal 
level, putting respect in place of superiority, becoming a convener, and provider of occasions, a 
facilitator and catalyst, a consultant and supporter” (…) brings “many satisfactions and non-material 
rewards” [86] (p. 14).  
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5.6. Energy Policy (Goal 7) 
As explained above, also the thematic SDGs have governance-related targets (listed by letters a.–c. 
under the respective Goals). For the energy Goal the governance-related targets are: (7.a) enhance 
international cooperation and (7.b) expand infrastructure and upgrade technology. Experience with 
energy policy shows that it is a case where a metagovernance approach would be particularly useful, to 
achieve the necessary differentiation. Nilsson et al. [87] (p. 4144) state that SDG energy development 
priorities may range from ensuring universal access to energy services and securing economic growth 
potential (e.g., low-income countries) to decoupling growth from energy consumption and greenhouse 
gas emissions (middle-income and emerging economies) or decarbonizing energy sectors and reaching 
new levels of efficiency performance (high-income countries).  
As regards Goal 7.1 on universal access to energy, it is probably relevant that energy production in 
many countries has turned from (local) public service to private enterprises, followed by scaling up into 
huge and powerful power companies, which are almost monopolies. As a counter reaction, and in order 
to speed up the transition to renewable energy, local initiatives have fought to decentralize energy 
production and making renewable energy again part of the “commons”. What can be observed in some 
countries is a governance transition from state/local via market steering (followed by market failures), 
back to local network initiatives steered and owned by local authorities and/or citizens. In other 
countries, energy production has been privatized to monopolist firms from the onset.  
This is of course a simplification of a very complex policy arena with strong vested interests and 
power play. A metagovernance view on energy policy could address the potential benefits and costs of 
each of these approaches instead of letting one (exclusively) dominate. Indeed, sustainable energy 
programs in Croatia and Mongolia, where market, network and hierarchical mechanisms were combined, 
have been analyzed as successful [63]. 
6. Metagovernance for CBDG: Step-by-Step 
In line with the aim to achieve differentiated governance frameworks to implement the SDGs, a 
metagovernance approach to SDG implementation itself can also not be a blueprint. Jessop [32]  
(p. 117) defines three principles for metagovernance practices which should be in place to reduce the 
likelihood of governance failures, which may be quite useful in this context: (1) Deliberate cultivation 
of a flexible repertoire of responses; (2) A reflexive orientation about what would be acceptable policy 
outcomes, and regular reassessment if actions are producing desired outcomes; (3) Self-reflexive “irony” 
in the sense that governor should recognize that failure is likely but still continue as if success if possible. 
With these caveats, we recommend that metagovernance for CBDG could include the following steps: 
(1). Mapping the governance environment: Who are the relevant actors and which roles do they have? 
What are the existing constitutional, legal, political and administrative settings, and which values 
and traditions may play a role? 
(2). Evaluation: What does an analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats 
(SWOT) of the current governance approach say? Are there existing standard solutions which 
may not be valid anymore? 
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(3). Problem setting: What are the challenges to be addressed as regards SDG implementation in a 
specific context (e.g., country) and is there agreement on the problem definition? 
(4). Translating the SDGs in national context, formulating country-specific goals and policy options, 
assessing their benefits and costs on environmental, economic and social parameters, and 
proposing targets, indicators and time frames.  
(5). Designing a governance framework, as part of Means of Implementation, based on a mindful 
selection of elements (institutions, instruments, processes and actor roles) from different 
governance styles, which are not mutually undermining but enforce and complement each other, 
and with a view on multi-level, cross-cutting and long-term aspects. 
(6). “Managing” the chosen governance framework, including application of principles like 
reflexivity, resilience, flexibility, allowing redundancy (“and” rather than “or”) and 
metagovernance strategies (re-combining, switching towards another style). 
(7). Review: including a review of (national) governance frameworks in the evolving cyclical review 
of the SDGs. The first review cycle would start with an analysis whether national commitments 
(see Step 4 above) are sufficiently specific and ambitious, and at the same time realistic, and 
whether states have the necessary Means of Implementation [71] (p. 26). This should include 
reviewing the feasibility of the designed governance framework (see Step 5 above), and even 
more importantly also in the subsequent review cycles on SDG implementation, which would 
again include reviewing how well the management thereof has worked. 
7. Summary and Outlook 
7.1. Establish “Common But Differentiated Governance” as Guiding Principle 
The SDGs are universally applicable and will therefore be implemented by all states, combined with 
roles for the regional and subnational level. To give some steer to this complex challenge, this article 
recommends introducing a general guiding principle for the implementation of the SDGs—the principle 
of “Common But Differentiated Governance” (CBDG). CBDG would ensure good linkage between the 
“common” Goals and “differentiated” implementation, with the latter taking into account different 
national realities, capacities and levels of development and respecting national policies and priorities. 
Applying the “common but differentiated” thinking to governance might also help overcoming the 
dichotomy between developed and developing countries that has evolved as connotation for CBDR 
(“Common But Differentiated Responsibilities”). 
7.2. Take World Views, Values and Traditions into Account  
SDG implementation and the governance thereof is not a technical exercise, run by “value-neutral” 
experts. Not only politicians and policy makers, but also academics may advocate one governance style 
above others, which might even come with an engrained conviction. It is therefore important to 
understand the worldviews, values and traditions of those who are involved in or would gain or lose 
from SDG implementation. Underlying values that are drivers for certain solutions and may block other 
solutions should be made explicit. For the SDGs, governance frameworks are needed, and they need to 
be transparent about their normative assumptions with regard to problem-definition and  
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problem-solving. This may result in “exposing” hidden preferences or long-standing assumptions about 
how certain issues should be tackled, which could lead to heated debates. However, without such “reality 
checks”, failures such as getting locked-in in unsustainable technologies may make SDG implementation 
also financially unsustainable.  
7.3. Use Metagovernance to “Engineer” CBDG 
Metagovernance is proposed as concept for developing governance frameworks for implementation 
of the SDGs, because this approach for designing and managing governance frameworks explicitly takes 
into account different challenges, realities and capacities. Looking with a metagovernance bird’s eye 
perspective at processes of development cooperation and sustainable development, shifts in preferences 
for governance styles can already be recognized. However, these have been sequential shifts over time, 
typically each accompanied and followed by reflections on the pros and cons of the respective approach, 
often looking for the Holy Grail, and ended in some convergence (“and” instead of “or”). The point of 
metagovernance is (a) the recognition of the strength and weaknesses of each style; (b) taking this into 
account from the onset in the process of (c) mindfully combining ideas and arrangements from different 
approaches. It is grounded in existing cultures and traditions, but facilitates a transformative agenda. 
This approach also suggests that copying standardized recipes (“best practices”) could result in 
governance failure, whereas learning from each other (and considering translating successful practices 
from elsewhere) could lead to success. 
7.4. Apply Key Governance Principles 
To support transitions towards SD, reflexivity, flexibility and long-term thinking need to be applied 
as governance principles, and the multi-sector, multi-level and multi-actor situations of each specific 
case are to be considered. On each relevant administrative or geographical level, governance design 
should begin with stock-taking of the governance environment, taking into account the specificities of 
each nation/region/city, i.e., analyzing the existing governance arrangements including what has worked 
historically and where are the gaps and obstacles. Trying to force a “purist” form of network governance 
might weaken itself in cases where the hierarchical segment of the governance system is in principle 
willing to constructively engage on an issue. Governments need to work on improving horizontal 
coordination (between government departments) and vertical coordination (the linkages between vertical 
levels), as well as on improving communication with citizens and invigorating understanding, ownership 
and engagement. 
7.5. Metagovernance Is Not a Return to State-Centered Governance 
While some convergence towards diversity in the academic debate on governance can be observed, 
there are also scholars who promote that SDG governance should build on network and market 
governance, and for whom metagovernance implies a return to undesired state-centered governance. 
Using the metagovernance concept to combine different governance styles into successful SDG 
governance frameworks implies to be open to a possibly strong role of the state. However, 
metagovernance as defined in this article is not pro-state—just as it is not anti-state either. 
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7.6. Step-by-Step Approach 
A simple step-by-step approach may guide metagovernance and CBDG for the SDGs, starting with 
mapping the governance environment, conducting a SWOT analysis and defining the challenges, 
defining policy options and on this basis designing a governance framework, with provisions to 
“manage” it in the course of time, and ending with a review. 
7.7. Establish Support Bodies, Partnerships and Peer Review Processes 
It is recommendable to establish support bodies/networks that help designing, reviewing and 
evaluating the governance frameworks for SDG implementation. Such bodies are also meant to take an 
integrated view of environmental, social and economic aspects, and with that also support policy 
coherence. Sustainable Development Councils mirroring the multi-sector, -level and -actor situation 
have been successful supporters and watchdogs of transition processes in a number of countries.  
Governments could also team up with others in partnerships for the SDG implementation across all the 
steps introduced, and set up peer review processes on SDG implementation. This might take the form of 
expert type of peer reviews, as practiced between OECD countries, or more stakeholder-based peer 
reviews, as some countries with a functioning SD strategy have performed, like The Netherlands and 
Germany. In both these cases a (independent) national SD Council coordinated the peer review process.  
7.8. Costs of Governance Failures and Benefits of CBDG 
Differentiated and “mindful” governance frameworks may let the SDGs offer good value for money. 
Applying metagovernance requires somewhat more human resources than standard or simplified 
governance, but the return on investment in terms of cost-savings may be huge. As a  
metagovernance-inspired framework does not reject any measures up-front, it is possible to select 
measures that are broadly accepted, which prevents costs caused by resistance and legal procedures. Such 
a framework implies built-in reflections also about long-term impacts. The long-term benefits of 
preventing lock-ins in unsustainable technological investments may be enormous. In the case of 
development cooperation, it is instrumental that taking such a direction is supported by donor countries.  
All in all, it seems worthwhile to introduce CBDG as guiding principle for the implementation of the 
universal Post-2015 SDGs. Developing situationally appropriate and overall cost-effective governance 
frameworks is no rocket science, and a metagovernance approach may be quite helpful in preventing 
and mitigating typical governance failures. Furthermore, yes, metagovernance failures also exist 
(Jessop), but this is not a reason not to engage.  
7.9. CBDG in the Future UN Multi-Level Review Process 
This article focuses on the governance for implementing the SDGs on sub-global levels, and therefore 
rather on the “differentiated” than on the “common” part. It supports the national (and potentially the 
regional, sub-national and local) level in designing an appropriate metagovernance framework, which 
might inspire and feed into the designing of the future UN multi-level review process as complex 
challenge currently underway. The review of the governance framework, as part of Means of 
Implementation, should in any case be included in the future review cycles for the SDG implementation. 
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SDG (meta)governance should be developed, managed and maintained at all levels of administration, 
because institutions “entrusted with creating a sustainable future cannot afford to have a weak governance 
structure” [72] (p. 14)—that is, if the ambition is really to implement the SDGs within this generation. 
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